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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) classifiers are vulnerable to
adversarial examples. An adversarial example is an input sample
which is slightly modified to induce misclassification in an ML
classifier. In this work, we investigate white-box and grey-box
evasion attacks to an ML-based malware detector and conduct
performance evaluations in a real-world setting. We compare
the defense approaches in mitigating the attacks. We propose
a framework for deploying grey-box and black-box attacks to
malware detection systems.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, adversarial ex-
amples, evasion attack, defense
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been shown that machine learning (ML) classifiers are
vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is
a small perturbation of the original inputs and carefully crafted
to misguide the classifier to produce incorrect output. As the
presence of ML increases in malware detection [1]–[6], so
does its likelihood of being attacked, hijacked or manipulated.
In this work, we examine the potential vulnerabilities of ML-
based malware detectors in adversarial environments. We hope
that our findings may motivate better use and safe practices
of ML for security applications.
The study of adversarial examples has continued to grow.
Biggio provided an overview of adversarial ML for the past
10 years [7]. There have been extensive studies of adversarial
examples in computer vision [8]–[14]. Szegedy [8] first
identified adversarial examples in deep neural networks (DNN)
and proposed L-BFGS attack. Goodfellow [9] proposed the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which is a simple and
fast method to generate adversarial examples for practical
adversarial training. Carlini [11] proposed the C&W attacks
by minimizing the L0, L2 and L∞ distance metrics. It is one
of the strongest attacks. Papernot [10] proposed the Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) which minimize the
number of features and magnitude to be manipulated. Atha-
lye [12] proposed the expectation over transformation (EOT)
algorithm to generate adversarial examples which remain
adversarial over a chosen transformation distribution.
Recent research of adversarial examples in malware detec-
tion has drawn attention in both ML and security communities
[16]–[19]. Grosse [16] presented the adversarial examples
for Android malware. Demetrio [19] used an interpretable
ML approach to identify the most influential features and
proposed an attack to generate adversarial malware examples
by manipulating the file header. There are some work on black-
box attack on images [20], [21] and malware [22]. However,
they are not in real-world black-box setting.
TABLE I
THE DATASET
Dataset Number of Samples
Training Set 57170 (28594 clean and 28576 malware)
Validation Set 578 (280 clean and 298 malware)
Test Set 45028 (16154 clean and 28874 malware)
Traditional techniques for making ML robust, such as
weight decay or dropout, do not provide a practical defense.
Adversarial training [9] and defensive distillation [23] are
two significant defense methods. Carlini [24] shows that the
current defense methods including [9], [23] are not effective.
The goal of this work is to study the vulnerabilities of an
ML-based malware detector and develop a solution resilient
to the evasion attack. The main contributions are
• We conducted white-box & grey-box attacks to an ML-
based malware detector with thorough evaluations.
• We developed defense mechanisms and compared their
effectiveness.
• We propose a framework for deploying gray-box and
black-box attacks in a real-world setting.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Data Description
The training data were collected by McAfee Labs in January
and February 2018. A subset of the training samples and the
trained DNN model (trained with millions of samples) were
provided. Table I shows the dataset including training set,
validation set and testing set. The testing data were collected
from VirusTotal, which are independent of the training data.
The 491 API features were extracted from log files. Table II
shows an excerpt of a log file. The logs capture the API calls
from the source files. Portable executable (PE) samples (exe
and dll) were used to generate logs. The mixed data, which
contained API logs generated from Win7, WinXP, Win8, and
Win10, were created. The raw counts of the APIs were applied
to feature transformation and the values were normalized to
[0,1]. Table III shows an excerpt of the API features.
B. Attack Experimental Setup
We design the white-box, grey-box and black-box attack
experiments. In white-box attack, the attacker has complete
knowledge of the system, including training data, features, and
ML models (i.e. DNN architecture and parameters). In grey-
box attack, the attacker has no knowledge of training data and
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TABLE II
EXCERPT OF A LOG FILE
GetStartupInfoW:7FEFDD39C37 ()"61468"
GetFileType:7FEFDD39D0C ()"61468"
GetModuleHandleW:13FBC34C3 ()"61484"
GetProcAddress:13FBC34D6 (76D30000,"FlsAlloc")"61484"
...
GetStartupInfoW:13FBC4539 ()"61484"
GetStdHandle:13FBC46F1 ()"61484"
GetFileType:13FBC4707 ()"61484"
FreeEnvironmentStringsW:13FBC4D49 ()"61484"
GetCPInfo:13FBC263D ()"61484"
TABLE III
EXCERPT OF THE API FEATURES
475 waitmessage
476 windowfromdc
477 winexec
478 writeconsolea
479 writeconsolew
480 writefile
481 writeprivateprofilestringa
482 writeprivateprofilestringw
483 writeprocessmemory
484 writeprofilestringa
ML model, but knowledge of the features. In black-box attack,
the attacker has no knowledge of the system.
1) JSMA for Adversarial Examples: In this work, we aim
to develop an attack with the perturbations using minimum
number of features, so we selected the JSMA [10]. The
success rate and transfer rate for the JSMA are relatively high.
The JSMA allows us to select the most important feature
associated with the maximum gradient based on the saliency
map, and perturb the feature to increase the likelihood of the
input as the target class. We compute the gradient of F with
respect to X to estimate the direction in which a perturbation
in X would change F s output. A perturbation of X with
maximal positive gradient into the target class 0 (clean) is
chosen. For F (X) = F0(X), F1(X),
5F = ∂F (X)
∂X
= [
∂Fi(X)
∂Xj
]i∈0,1,j∈[1,M ], (1)
Where M is the number of features; i = 0, 1 is clean and
malware. We ensure that only API calls are added and not
deleting any existing features. We make sure the functionality
of malware unchanged. CleverHans [15] was used for the
JSMA implementation. The θ controls the perturbations in-
troduced to modified features. The γ controls the maximum
percentage of perturbed features, which is associated with the
number of perturbed features. Figure 1 shows how to generate
an adversarial example for malware. The adversarial example
evades the malware detector and is recognized as benign.
2) Transferability of Adversarial Examples: Adversarial
examples generated from one ML model can be used to
misclassify another model, even if both models have different
architectures and training data. This property is called trans-
ferability. This property holds because a contiguous subspace
with a large dimension in the adversarial space is shared
among different models [26]. The transferability of adversarial
examples makes the grey-box and black-box attacks become
Fig. 1. Generate an adversarial example for malware. The left is one
malware sample with 491 features. The middle one is adding two API calls
- ’destroyicon’ and ’dllsload’. The right is the adversarial example.
Fig. 2. A framework for grey-box and black-box attacks in real-world setting
possible. Papernot [21] shows that multiple ML algorithms are
vulnerable due to the transferability of adversarial examples.
Figure 2 shows the framework for grey-box and black-
box attacks in real-world testing and the transferability of
adversarial examples in malware detection. The attacker can
train a substitute model to craft adversarial examples and
deploy them to the target model to evade the detection. The
attacker’s model, features and training data are different from
the target model, features and training data. In this work, the
target model is 4-layer fully connected DNN (The target model
is proprietary, so we cannot release the detail information.)
Table IV summarizes the architectures of the substitute model,
an 5-layer DNN.
C. Defense Methods
We applied the four defense approaches for the ML malware
engine. Our considerations in defense are low impact on model
architecture and model speed, and maintain model accuracy.
1) Adversarial Training: The basic idea of adversarial
training [8], [9] is to inject adversarial examples into training
process and train the model so that the model can generalize
to defense against the attacks. The approach has been shown
effective with only a small loss of accuracy. However, it
needs adversarial examples to train the model, and the defense
performance decreases for different attack methods.
2) Defensive Distillation: There are two models in defen-
sive distillation [23]. The first model is trained as usual. The
second model (compressed model) is trained with the prob-
abilities (soft labels) learned from the first one. The benefit
TABLE IV
THE SUBSTITUE MODEL
57170 balanced training data
5-layer DNN
1st layer 491 nodes
2nd layer 1200 nodes
3rd layer 1500 nodes
4th layer 1300 nodes
5th layer 2 nodes
of using soft class labels lies in the additional knowledge
in probabilities, compared to hard class labels. Defensive
distillation prevents models from fitting too tightly to the
data and contributes to better generalization. Distillation is
controlled by the softmax temperature T . High T force DNN
to produce probabilities with large values for each class.
3) Feature Squeezing: Feature squeezing [25] reduces the
degrees of freedom for the attacker to construct adversarial
examples by squeezing out unnecessary input features. We
used L1 norm to measure the distance between the model’s
prediction on the original sample and the prediction on
the sample after squeezing. If the distance is larger than a
threshold, then the input sample is an adversarial example.
Otherwise, it is a legitimate sample. The assumption is that
the squeezing significantly impacts the classifier’s prediction
on the adversarial examples while it has no significant impact
on the classifier’s prediction on the legitimate samples.
4) Dimensionality Reduction: The approach uses Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) for dimensionality reduction [27].
Instead of training a classifier on the original data, it reduces
the features from the n-dimension to k (k << n), and trains
the classifier on the reduced input. The defense restricts the
attacker to the first k components. The assumption is that
adversarial examples rely on principal components. Therefore,
restricting the attack to the first k components should increase
the required distortion to produce adversarial examples.
D. Evaluation Metrics
For attack evaluation, we used the security evaluation curve
(detection rate as a function of attack strength), transferability
in terms of transfer rate, and perturbation measured by L2
distance norm between the adversarial examples and the
original examples. For defense evaluation, we use confusion
matrix - true positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR),
false positive rate (FPR), and false negative rate (FNR).
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. White-box Attack
The white-box attack on 28, 874 malware samples is shown
in Figure 3, where (a) θ = 0.1 and γ = [0 : 0.005 : 0.030]
adding [0 : 2 : 14] features, and (b) γ = 0.025 and
θ = [0 : 0.0125 : 0.15]. For both (a) and (b), the detection
rates drop significantly when attack strength increases either
by adding more API calls or increasing the frequency of the
API calls. Randomly adding features does not decrease the
detection rates. The results show that the white-box evasion
(a)θ = 0.100 (b)γ = 0.025
Fig. 3. Security evaluation curve for white-box attack. γ is assciated with the
number of perturbed features. θ is the magnitude of perturbed features.
(a)θ = 0.100 (b)γ = 0.005
(c)θ = 0.100, binary features
Fig. 4. Security evaluation curves for gray-box attacks. γ is the number of
perturbed features and θ is the magnitude of perturbed features.
attack is effective. The JSMA perturbation is different from
random noise. In the operating point θ = 0.1 and γ = 0.025
(adding 12 features), the detection rate drops to 0.099, which
indicates 26, 015 malware evasion.
B. Grey-box Attack
We design three experiments for gray-box attacks. For the
first one, we assume the attacker knows the exact 491 features.
The substitute model is used to craft the adversarial examples,
which are then deployed to the target model. We train the
substitute model with 1000 epoch, batch size = 256 and
(a)θ = 0.100 (b)γ = 0.005
Fig. 5. L2 distances in gray-box attack using original features
learning rate = 0.001 and Adam optimizer. We use 28, 874
malware samples to craft adversarial examples. The gray-
box attack is shown in Figure 4, where (a)θ = 0.1 and
(b)γ = 0.005 (i.e. adding 2 features). The results show that the
gray-box attack is effective. The detection rates of the target
model significantly decrease with a small number of perturbed
features or with small amount magnitude changes. It indicates
that the attacker can craft the adversarial examples using the
substitute model to evade the DNN malware detector. In the
operating point θ = 0.1 and γ = 0.005, which associated with
adding 2 features, the detection rate of the target model drops
to 0.147. The transfer rate is 0.853. It indicates that 24, 630
malware can evade the malware detector. The gray-box attack
is less effective than the white-box attack because the attacker
has less knowledge about the target system.
For the second experiment, we assume the attacker does
not have knowledge of the DNN model and the feature
transformation but knows API calls as features. We create a
substitute model using binary features - when the API appears,
the feature value equals one, otherwise equals to zero. Figure
4 (c) shows the detection rates decrease significantly when
the attack strength increases by adding more API calls for the
substitute model, but does not significantly impact the target
model. The detection rate of the target model is 0.6951. The
transfer rate is 0.3049. It shows the attack is less effective
when attacker has less knowledge about the features.
To understand adversarial examples across the decision
boundary, we evaluated the L2 distances for (1) malware and
adversarial examples (2) malware and clean (3) clean and
adversarial examples. The L2 results are shown in Figure 5,
where (a)θ = 0.1 and (b)γ = 0.005 (i.e. adding 2 features).
Both plots show consistent results. The results show that the
distance for malware and adversarial examples is the shortest
and the distance for clean to adverarial examples is the largest.
The distance increases when the attack strength increase. From
the results, we can see that the adversarial examples in high
dimension feature space are in the blind spot far away from
clean, and not lie in the decision boundary between malware
and clean, which provides us the insight for defense.
For the third experiment, we conducted the live gray-box
testing. We were provided a source file and an associated log
file. We used the substitute model to generate an adversarial
example. We asked a security researcher to add one single API
call multiple times in the source code and ran the DNN engine
to detect this sample. The DNN engine originally detects this
sample as malware with 98.43% confidence. After adding
this API once in the source code, the detection rate drops to
88.88% confidence. When adding the same API eight times
in the source code, the detection rate drops to 0%. It indicates
the adversarial example successfully evaded the DNN malware
detector in a real-world gray-box setting.
C. Defense
We applied the four defense methods in Section II-C. The
results of the defense approaches are shown in Table VI. In
adversarial training, we did sanity check on the data to reduce
TABLE V
ADVERSARIAL TRAINING DATASET
Dataset Number of Samples
Training Set 53482(26118 clean, 27364 malware and advEx)
Test Set 26560(5090 clean, 5252 malware and 16218 advEx)
TABLE VI
DEFENSE TESTING RESULTS
Dataset Name TPR TNR
No Defense
Clean Test nan 0.964
Malware Test 0.883 nan
AdvExamples 0.304 nan
AdvTraining
Clean Test nan 0.995
Malware Test 0.888 nan
AdvExamples 0.931 nan
Distillation
Clean Test nan 0.428
Malware Test 0.573 nan
AdvExamples 0.577 nan
FeaSqueezing
Clean Test nan 0.586
Malware Test nan 0.438
AdvExamples 0.554 nan
DimReduct
Clean Test nan 0.674
Malware Test 0.914 nan
AdvExamples 0.913 nan
the duplicated samples. A subset of the adversarial examples
from the gray-box attack (θ = 0.1 and γ = 0.02) and a
subset of testing malware were added to the training set. In
order to make the training set balance, we added a subset of
clean samples into the training set. Table V shows the dataset.
The testing results show that adversarial training significantly
increases the detection rate for adversarial examples from
0.304 to 0.931. At the same time, it also increases the TNR
from 0.964 to 0.998 without compromising the detection rate
for the original malware. In dimension reduction, we selected
K = 19. The testing results show that both detection rates of
adversarial examples and malware significantly increases to
0.913 and 0.914. However, the TNR decreases from 0.964 to
0.674. The results suggest we may consider ensemble adver-
sarial training and dimension reduction. For both defensive
distillation (T = 50) and feature squeezing, the detection
rate of adversarial examples increases. However, the TNR for
detecting clean and TPR for detecting malware drop.
IV. CONCLUSION
The JSMA attack shows that modifying one bit in the
feature vector can bypass the real-world ML-based malware
detector. The attack can be done by modifying the malware
source code by adding one API call. We show some prelimi-
nary results on building attack resiliency to API additions for
mitigation. It is an open challenge to design a defense against a
powerful adaptive attack. For future work, we are building the
real-world black-box testing framework as proposed in Figure
2 using open source data with different features and models.
We will study the intepretability of adversarial examples to
develop more effective defenses.
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